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Spain is the only large European country in which airport management is strictly centralized and 
publicly owned. This peculiar institutional setting prevents competition among Spanish airports, 
and policy makers and bureaucrats in charge of the system regularly justify it on grounds of inter-
territorial solidarity. This paper tests whether allocation of investments in airports is effectively 
based on redistributive purposes, as claimed and looks at other factors to explain such allocation. 
Our empirical analysis suggests that neither a progressive redistribution target nor the scale 
economies criterion explain allocation decisions. Instead, we find that political factors have 
significant influence on the allocation decisions made by the government. 
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1.  Introduction 
Traditionally, airports have been seen as monopolistic infrastructures that hold tight control 
over flights with origins and destinations in their hinterlands. Consequently, neither economic 
analysis nor infrastructure policy used to consider competition one of the relevant features of 
airports. Several changes have introduced competition among airports and weakened the 
conventional view.  
Two changes are particularly important. Globalization has brought a sharp increase in the 
demand for long distance flights, but non-stop long distance flights, such as intercontinental flights, 
are offered by few airports. Hence, a market has emerged for short distance flights from small and 
medium size airports to large facilities, where passengers can connect with non-stop long distance 
flights. The ability of airports and airlines to channel this flow is a central factor in determining the 
non-stop long distance flights offered from a particular airport (Bel and Fageda, 2005). Other 
factors, such as the increasing use of air transportation for leisure purposes, have also produced 
competition between airports to attract point-to-point low cost services, which can expand traffic at 
a very high rate. 
At the same time, there has been a clear trend towards corporatization of airports since the late 
eighties. Like privatization, corporatization has been seen as a way to reform airports whose 
ownership and management have remained public. Competition has been seen as a powerful tool to 
stimulate efficiency, and corporatizated management is more focused on commercial policies. In 
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this way, methods such as competitive tendering of commercial services and recruitment of flights 
to feed the most valuable airline offers have been given a growing role in airport management. 
Competition among airports at the international level is now a standard feature in all developed 
countries. Moreover, within each country airports compete to grow and win an increasing part of 
the business. Spain, alone among developed countries with more than one large airport, defies this 
pattern. Despite having a large population and several large airports, Spain has organized air travel 
as a totally integrated network: airports are exclusively owned and managed by the central 
government. Thus, competition among airports does not exist. The market has no role in issues 
such as pricing (setting taxes for using airport facilities) or resource allocation. All is decided on 
bureaucratic basis and approved within the Spanish Government budgetary process. 
Why is the Spanish system such an exception? No matter the political affiliation of the ruling 
party, policy makers and bureaucrats have regularly pointed to inter-territorial solidarity as the main 
rationale for their choice. The story goes as follows: less developed areas in Spain must have 
airports for regional development. However, such areas cannot sustain airports costs. Therefore, 
centralized management and allocation of funds allows the surplus from the largest and most 
profitable airports to pay for the deficits incurred by the smallest and least profitable airports. In 
short, rich airports pay for keeping poor airports working. 
One could ask whether alternative systems of grants and subsidies could work better to make up 
the deficits of the non-profitable airports. In every other country, no matter its system of 
management and funding, these kinds of tools are used so that unprofitable airports can operate. 
The goal of this paper is not to belabor a question that every other developed nation has answered 
to its satisfaction. 
Instead, we will empirically contrast two explanations for the persistence of the unusual model 
in Spain. On one hand is the public interest explanation. From the point of view of the ‘general 
interest’, market mechanisms would generate a less than socially desirable level of airport operating 
facilities, and public intervention is needed to correct this ‘market failure’. This is consistent with the 
standard explanation by policy-makers and bureaucrats we have summarized above.   3
Besides this standard explanation, we explore a public choice approach. Within that framework, 
the agents of governments are rational utility maximizers: politicians trying to maximize success in 
elections, while officials seek to maximize their own budget. As long as each group pursues its own-
interests they will tend to resist institutional arrangements that might constrain their behavior and 
enhance opportunities for efficient performance. Within our specific framework, introducing 
market mechanisms in the provision of public services would limit increases in the discretionary 
budgets in the control of officials, as stated in Niskanen’s (1971) seminal work.  
As far as social welfare maximization is concerned, it could potentially justify constraint of 
market mechanisms with the aim of progressive redistribution. This brings us to a traditional 
conundrum of public policy; the trade-off between efficiency and equity. However, if we accept that 
the behavior of public agents is guided to some extent by their own interest, some policies designed 
to prevent competition, while justified on the grounds of progressive redistribution, might actually 
be based on selfish motivations.
1 In such a case, those policies would advance neither efficiency nor 
equity.  
As noted, airport management in Spain is embodied with specific features that allow us to test a 
hypothesis about the behavior of government agents. Since one of the main consequences of 
integrated airport management is that decisions about investment are centralized in the national 
government, we want to disentangle the following questions: Is the allocation of investments in 
Spanish airports effectively based on redistributive purposes? Which factors explain actual 
allocations? Is airport policy in Spain consistent with publicly announced objectives?  
To advance our research we organize the paper as follows. First, we briefly review the main 
features of the Spanish system of airport management and finance and analyze it within the 
framework of international models. Next, we systematize the empirical background on determinants 
of regional allocation of infrastructure investment. Then we proceed with our empirical analysis. 
Initially, we focus on economic factors, and subsequently, political factors. Finally, we summarize 
our main results and draw out their main implications. 
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2. Airport management in Spain: The exception to the rule  
High quality airport facilities foster intercity agglomeration economies and influence the location 
decision of firms, especially those in knowledge intensive sectors (Brueckner, 2003). Hence, the link 
between the quality of airport facilities and urban economic growth could provide a rationale for 
guaranteeing airport facilities in less developed regions. In a similar way, scale economies could 
provide a motivation to guarantee airport facilities in less populated regions, which can only 
generate a low demand of air traffic.  
Indeed high fixed costs associated with airport operations may help explain the existence of a 
positive relationship (although no necessarily a lineal one) between air traffic and airport 
profitability –and so the amount of self-finance available for investments. Airports that generate a 
low volume of traffic may not be profitable. However, the expenditure needed to support small 
airports should not be high because several studies show that scale economies in airport operations 
are modest (European Commission, 2002). 
Managing airports as an integrated national network arises as a, though by no means the only, 
possible strategy for regional development. In fact, as shown in table 1, European airports that 
belong to large national airport networks are usually managed on an autonomous basis. This is the 
case for Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom (and other large Anglo-Saxon countries 
such as the USA, Canada and Australia). Autonomy is also the case for the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Belgium and Austria. Indeed, in all these countries grants and subsidies to small airports and/or 
airports located in poor regions are often available from more than one government level. 
Where a national network is run in a centralized way, it has just one large airport. Such a 
situation exists in Sweden, Portugal, Ireland, Finland, and most of the new accession countries. 
Spanish is unique, because it is the only European country with several large cities and airports in 
which all airports are managed by a single national agency.  
Insert table 1 about here 
  Indeed, Spanish Airports and Air Navigation (AENA) owns and manages more than 40 
commercial airports in Spain. AENA is a public entity belonging to the Ministry in charge of   5
transportation issues, and it enjoys an autonomous legal and economic status. Investment decisions 
are centralized and are financed through the surplus of the entire airport system. In effect, there is a 
system of non-transparent, cross-subsidization across Spanish airports. Importantly, politicians have 
justified centralized management on the grounds that it supports territorial cohesion. The possibility 
of competition between airports or the benefits of a differentiated commercial policy is not 
recognized. 
Where airports are managed on market criteria, the amount of investment in each airport should 
be strongly associated with the revenues obtained from local operations. Such revenues are 
fundamentally determined by the amount of traffic at the airport. On the contrary, when a territorial 
cohesion criterion is in place less developed regions should receive more resources for investment 
than their share of traffic would justify. Furthermore, scale economies should justify an investment 
allocation outcome in which large (profitable) airports cross-subsidize small (unprofitable) airports.     
In this way, table 2 shows the relationship between investment and passenger traffic for the 
Spanish airport network in period 1994-2003, and the corresponding relative position of each region 
in terms of population and per capita income. We present the results aggregated on a regional basis 
because the regional level is the one for which most of the variables needed for further analysis are 
available (individual information for each airport is available upon request). This period of ten years 
is long enough to smooth out distortions from single projects in a particular period, although a 
complete cycle of airport investments is considered to last twenty years. Column (5) shows the 
relationship for every Spanish region between share of total investment and share of total 
passengers. Where the ratio is larger than one, relative investment in the region is larger than relative 
traffic. A ratio smaller than one, of course, indicates that relative investment in the region is lower 
than relative traffic. 
Insert table 2 about here 
In the period 1994-2003, the richest Spanish region, Madrid, accumulated about 60 per cent of 
total investment but only 20 per cent of total traffic. The ratio (investment share)/(traffic share) is 
certainly high: 2.66. Overall, airports in the less developed Spanish regions (Andalusia, Extremadura,   6
Galicia, and Murcia) received a share of investment lower than their share of air traffic generated. 
Thus, the allocation of airport investments in Spain does not seem to follow the territorial cohesion 
criterion regularly used by politicians to justify centralized management. Furthermore, several lightly 
populated regions with low levels of air traffic have an investment/traffic ratio smaller than one. In 
short, we must go look further to determine whether airport investments decisions have been 
effectively guided by other motives.    
 
3. Determinants of regional allocation of infrastructure investment: Empirical 
background 
Since Aschauer’s (1989) seminal work, a great number of macro-econometric studies have 
analyzed the impact of public capital stock on private sector productivity [e.g.  Munell (1990), 
Duffy-Deno and Ebberts (1991), Garcia-Milà and McGuire (1992), and Holtz-Eakin (1994)]. In 
general terms, such impact is considered to be relevant although there is no agreement on the 
precise elasticities estimated. The empirical literature on the determinants of the regional allocation 
of public investments is much scarcer. Attention has been mainly focused on the traditional trade-
off between equity and efficiency in public policies. Yamano and Ohkawara (2000) analyze that 
trade-off for 47 prefectures in Japan. They estimate a production function in order to obtain the 
marginal productivity of each production factor (labor, private capital and public capital) in the 
period 1970-1994. Their results suggest that the regional allocation policies in Japan over that period 
have involved an inefficient outcome. The relative increase of public investment in less developed 
prefectures has lead to public capital shortages in developed prefectures. Simulation of different 
alternative policies shows that the overall welfare loss of the actual policy with regard to the efficient 
one has been considerable.  
In a similar fashion, de la Fuente (2005) develops a model to compare the welfare levels 
involved with different policies for the allocation of public investments across regions. His main 
goal is to examine whether it is economically sound to use public investment in infrastructure for 
redistributive purposes when governments have other instruments available, such as taxes and social 
expenditures. In a second-best scenario, where ex-post redistribution is limited, de la Fuente shows   7
that it is justified to undertake a higher level of investments in less developed regions than required 
by a strict efficiency criterion. The reasoning underlying this result is that optimality conditions 
require equality across regions of the marginal contribution of public investment to welfare, not to 
output, which depends critically on disparities in the level of income. The model is tested using 
Spanish data on the infrastructure stock in 1995. Results indicate that the regional allocation of 
infrastructure investments in Spain has been too redistributive.  
Other studies add to this literature by analyzing not just the efficiency-equity issue but also the 
role of political factors in explaining the regional allocation of public investment in infrastructure.
2 
Kemmerling and Stephan (2002) analyze empirically the politico-economic determinants of local 
infrastructure investment decisions. Indeed, they estimate simultaneously a system of three 
equations for 87 large German cities in the years 1980, 1986 and 1988. The equation-system is 
composed of a production function, a local government investment function and a central 
government investment grant allocation function. Estimates show that the equity objective 
(measured by the influence of income on investments) matters much more than the efficiency one 
(measured by the influence of marginal productivity of public capital on investments). In addition, 
political support from citizens for the incumbent party in the central government is decisive in 
explaining the distribution of investment grants across cities, while the electoral productivity of each 
city (in terms of the number of votes that can be obtained from citizens indifferent between the two 
parties) does not seem to influence central government investment choices.   
Closely related to the work of Kemmerling and Stephan (2002) is the study of Castells and Solé 
(2005). They analyze the possibility that political considerations promote differences in the 
attractiveness of regions to the central government in such a way that a deviation from the 
efficiency-equity rule can arise. The starting point of this study is a social welfare function, where 
the traditional trade-off of infrastructure stock allocation across regions is measured through a linear 
combination of population and income. Moreover, Castells and Solé include, as explanatory 
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determinants of public investment in infrastructure, variables for the electoral productivity of 
expenditures across regions (in terms of the marginal electoral gains that can be obtained) and the 
political support of the corresponding region for the incumbent party in the central government. 
The model is empirically implemented using Spanish data of public investment in transportation 
infrastructure in the period 1987-1996. Results are consistent with the expectations that both equity-
efficiency considerations (in an apparently balanced way) and political factors influence the 
allocation choices of governments. 
Certainly, the efficiency-equity trade-off relationship in infrastructure policies is a basic and 
relevant story. But it is not the sole story to be found in the regional allocation of public 
investments in infrastructure. Indeed, in some circumstances such policies may pursue neither 
efficiency nor equity. Budget-maximizing officials and vote-maximizing politicians can guide such 
allocation towards other objectives.   
4. Empirical analysis: Determinants of the regional allocation of airport investments  
In order to obtain an equation that explains the allocation of airport investments across regions, 
we consider the case in which the central government maximizes a social welfare function. To this 
regard, we follow the approach of Bernham and Craig (1987). The welfare function of the central 
government is defined over infrastructure outcomes in region i (i =1,.....15) from a given country at 
period t (t = 1,….10) and can be expressed through the following form: 
                                                 Wt = ∑i Oit  ,                                                                             (1) 
where  Oit is a vector of infrastructure outcomes.  This expression implies that the central 
government maximizes infrastructure outcomes. The first derivative with respect to Oit is assumed 
to be positive (∂Wt/∂Oit> 0).  
The central government’s maximization problem is subject to two constraints. First, there is a 
resource constraint. This implies that total investments can not be higher than the total resources 
available for that purpose:  
                                                ∑i INVit ≤ Rt  ,                                                                                                                                (2)   9
where Rt are total resources available at period t, which are assumed to be fixed and constant 
across regions, and INVit are airport investments across regions.  
The second constraint specifies that infrastructure outcomes across regions depend on 
investments made on them weighted by a vector of regional characteristics, Zi, at period t such that 
unequal concern of the central government about different regions can arise:  
                                                        Oit= Cit(Zi)h(INVit), h’>0, h’’<0                                                                                 (3) 
The vector of regional characteristics can include several aspects, such as product per capita, 
total annual passengers carried in the airport, the proportion of international traffic with respect to 
the total traffic and political considerations. Indeed, where territorial cohesion criteria influence the 
airport investment decisions of the central government, regions with low product per capita should 
receive proportionally more investment than regions with high product per capita. In addition to 
this, airport investment across regions should generally be linked to economic needs, which, in turn, 
are strongly associated with the air traffic demand generated by both local populations and 
interconnections made by hub operations. Furthermore, the central government could try to 
maximize the surpluses of domestic rather than international passengers, since the latter are not 
incorporated in the social welfare function. Finally, the political clout of each region, due to the 
popularity of the central government’s incumbent party in the corresponding region or due to the 
correspondence between the incumbent party in the central and regional governments, may play a 
central role in the allocation choice of public resources of the central government as we will see 
below.  
First order conditions of the central government’s maximization problem yield  
h’(INVit) Cit(Zi) = m, for all i                                               (4) 
Here, m is the multiplier associated to the resource constraint, which necessarily binds. This 
means that if Cit(Zi)>Cjt(Zj), then h’(INVit)<h’(INVjt), and by concavity INVit>INVjt. This provides 
us with a general specification of the investment equations that are going to be tested in our 
empirical analysis:   
INVit/Rt = g(Cit(Zi))                                                     (5)   10
In this equation, g is an increasing function. Our empirical model will use a linear approach, 
which could be justified as a first order Taylor approximation.  
 
4.2. Economic factors 
It is of central interest in our empirical analysis to analyze any type of cross-subsidization that can 
take place between the regional networks of the Spanish airport system. Hence equation (5) can we 
expressed four our empirical analysis in the following way:  
                                  INVit = µ1 + β1GDPit + β2PAX it + β3INTERNit + ε it,                            (6) 
where INVit refers to the percentage of investment made in airports from region i with respect 
to the total investment in the national airport network. GDPit refers to Gross Domestic Product per 
capita
3, PAXit refers to the percentage of annual passengers carried in the airports from region i with 
respect to the total annual traffic in the national airport network and INTERNit refers to the 
percentage of international passengers carried in the airports from region i with respect to the total 
annual traffic in the regional airport network. 
In order to estimate this model for Spain, we have constructed panel data for the period 1994-
2003 for the 15 Spanish regions with airports. Data on the territorial allocation of investment have 
been obtained from the Ministry of Transport web page; data for Gross Domestic Product per 
capita have been obtained from the Spanish Statistics Institute. Finally, data of airport traffic have 
been obtained from AENA. Table A-1 in Appendix 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the 
variables used for estimating our investment equation.
4 
Given that airports in Spain are managed on an integrated basis, the empirical analysis can be 
simplified in two ways. Firstly, the variable for the annual traffic at airports can be incorporated in 
the model as an exogenous variable because revenues from operations in the current year do not 
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necessarily influence the level of investments that will be undertaken in the current and following 
years. This is so because investments in a specific airport do not necessarily depend on the revenues 
obtained in the same airport. Second, specific regional effects should not be relevant since regions 
do not have any role in the allocation of airport investments. Additionally, regional characteristics 
that influence infrastructure costs are not as relevant for airports as they are for ground 
transportation modes. So, any difference across regions should be based on factors affecting central 
government choices.  
In this sense, our data set does not incorporate specific effects that should vary across regions 
but are time invariant. Such a fixed effects model would not be convenient because we do not have 
enough degrees of freedom. Furthermore, the Hausman specification test and the Breush and Pagan 
Lagrange Multiplier test reject the suitability of the random effects model.
5 Thus, our estimates are 
based on a pooled regression without regional dummy variables. As a baseline method, we use the 
Feasible Generalized Least Squares Estimator (FGLS).  
We also undertake our estimations though the Prais-Winsten method (PW) in order to account 
for heteroscedasticity and correlation across the units of observation. In addition, we analyze a 
possible concern related to temporal inertia, as long as investment projects in airports are frequently 
multi-year efforts, by incorporating dynamics explicitly in the model. Such estimation is undertaken 
through the Prais-Winsten method in an instrumental variables regression (PW-IV). Finally, time 
specific effects are also incorporated in this regression. Table 3 shows the results of our estimates, 
while table 4 indicates the elasticities than can be inferred from them.  
Insert table 3 about here 
Insert table 4 about here 
 
When dynamics is not explicitly incorporated into the estimation, all variables are significant and 
the overall explanatory power of the equation estimated is reasonably high, regardless of the 
econometric technique used. Our results show clear evidence that progressive redistribution is not 
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relevant to the airport investment choice of the central government. Indeed, the percentage of total 
investments in a region seems to increase when product per capita of that region also increases. In 
addition to this, we do not find evidence that airport investments are guided by a scale economies 
argument in the more parsimonious specification of our investment equation. In fact, the 
percentage of total investments increases more than proportionally to the output generated for each 
regional airport network. In contrast, holding the other factors constant, the percentage of total 
investments is lower in regional airport networks with a higher proportion of international traffic.  
Table A-2 in appendix 1 provides additional evidence of the results obtained in our estimates of 
the investment equation. In this way, table A-2 presents airport financial data for the last two years 
in which this information is available, 1997 and 1998.
6 From the data, it can be observed that cross-
subsidization across Spanish airports does not take place from high-profitability to low-profitability 
regional networks, as would be expected if scale economies controlled. Indeed, the most profitable 
airport has the highest traffic-investment ratio, while many of the non-profitable airports have 
traffic-investment rates lower than one. In fact, data from this table, along with the results of the 
investment equation estimates, allows us to infer a type of redistribution not mentioned by Spanish 
airport authorities. All profitable regional networks with low investment-traffic ratios (Balearic 
Island, Canary Islands, Andalusia and C. Valenciana) have a common feature. They all have, at least, 
one large tourist airport. This indicates cross-subsidization from international to domestic 
passengers.  
Finally, it is worth noting that the test of serial correlation, using the modified Durbin-Watson 
test for panel data proposed by Bhargava et al. (1982), does not indicate a problem of that type. 
However, we prefer to include dynamics explicitly because, as we mentioned above, some degree of 
temporal inertia can be expected in our data. Instruments for the lagged dependent variable are the 
second, third and fourth lags (airport projects does not usually run for more than 4 years). Results 
of this additional estimation are not substantially different from the previous one, although the size 
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of the coefficients for the rest of the variables is lower. In this sense, the elasticity of central 
government’s investments with respect to the output generated in the regional airport networks is 
lower than one. However, the use of the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable 
distorts interpretation of individual coefficients. In any case, as table A-4 in the appendix show, 
investments per capita increases more than proportionally to output generated for each regional 
airport network regardless of the specification that we use. At last, incorporating time specific 
effects does not alter our basic conclusions.   
4.3. Political factors 
As long as neither progressive redistribution nor scale economies seem to be the real objective of 
the centralization of the Spanish airport network, further analysis is needed to understand the 
objectives of Spanish airport authorities. Several studies [Cadot et al. (1999), Kemmerling and 
Stephan (2002), Castells and Solé (2005)] show that political motivations based on the self-interest 
of the public decision-makers can play a crucial role in the allocation of the stock of infrastructure 
across regions.  
Where election systems are based on proportional rules, as is the case in Spain, politicians are 
motivated to maximize the number of votes their party obtains.
7 Following Grossman (1994), the 
incumbent party in the central government may allocate public resources in order to buy the 
support of voters and political agents across regions. Ceteris paribus, more resources will be 
invested in those regions that have the most–and most valuable--political capital to offer. Such 
political capital will be greater where the support for the incumbent party in the central government 
is also greater, and it will be even more valuable where a correspondence exists between the 
incumbent party in the central government and the incumbent party in the regional government.   
In order to capture these two political factors, we add to equation (6) the following political 
variables that are estimated separately to avoid multicollineality.
8 
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   Incumbent: Percentage of votes in the last general elections for the incumbent party in the central 
government in the corresponding regions of the sample 
   Correspondence: Dummy variable that takes value 1 when there is a correspondence between the 
incumbent party in the central government and the incumbent party in the regional government.  
Data for these political variables have been obtained from the web site of the Ministry of 
Domestic Affairs (Ministerio del Interior). It is expected that the central government will invest 
more in regions where political support for the corresponding incumbent party in the central 
government is greater. In addition, it is expected that the central government will invest more in 
regions where a correspondence does exist between the incumbent party in the central government 
and the incumbent party in the regional government 
Tables 5 and 6 show the results of our estimates when incorporating the variable incumbent, 
while tables 7 and 8 show the results when incorporating the variable correspondence. 
Insert table 5 about here 
Insert table 6 about here 
Insert table 7 about here 
Insert table 8 about here 
 
Results for the economic variables do not change substantially in relation to those obtained in the 
specification without political variables.  
The variable capturing the influence of partisan support, Incumbent, is statistically and 
economically significant. Thus, we find evidence that partisan support plays an important role in the 
investment allocation choices of the central government. Indeed, the incumbent party in the central 
government seems to compensate regions for partisan support in order to assure votes.  
The dummy variable capturing the correspondence between the incumbent party in the central 
government and the incumbent party in the regional government is also statistically and 
economically significant. Thus, political affiliation seems to favor better coordination between 
decision-makers at different territorial levels of government.  
                                                                                                                                                             
difference in the percentage of votes between the two main parties in the general elections across regions shows that 
such effect is, in our context, not relevant.    15
Overall, our results suggest that politics really mater in the allocation of airport investments across 
regions. Divergence between the policy announced and the policy effectively implemented could be 
explained, at least to some extent, by a desire to maximize the contribution of that policy to the re-
election chances of the incumbent party.  
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
The Spanish model of airport management and finance is singular among comparable developed 
countries. Spain is unique among countries with several large cities and important airports in that its 
system is strictly centralized and publicly owned. This peculiar institutional setting prevents 
competition among Spanish airports, and policy makers and bureaucrats in charge of the system 
rhetorically justify it on grounds of inter-territorial solidarity. Within this context, we have devoted 
this research to answering several questions: Is the allocation of investments in airports in Spain 
effectively motivated by redistributive purposes? Which factors have actually explained allocations? 
Is airport policy in Spain consistent with the objectives publicly announced?  
Through our empirical analysis of the determinants of airport investments in Spain across 
regions, we find that the choices of the central government have been directed by neither a 
progressive redistribution criterion nor the demands of scale economies. Indeed, ceteris paribus 
high-income regions receive relatively more public resources than low-income regions. In addition 
to this, we do not find evidence that investment increases less than proportionally to the output 
generated by the regional airport networks, while our data shows that cross-subsidization from 
high-profitability airports to low-profitability regional networks does not take place. On the 
contrary, it seems to take place cross-subsidization from international to domestic passengers.  
Given that economic factors do not explain the allocation of investments across regions, we pay 
attention to the influence of political motivations. We find that the incumbent party in the central 
government tries to maximize support from regional citizens. Indeed, more public resources are 
invested in those regions where the support for the party in central government is greater. In   16
addition to this, more public resources are invested in those regions where the incumbent party in 
the central government and the incumbent party in the regional government are the same.  
When talking about the Spanish airports, rich guys do not pay to keep poor guys’ airports 
working. According to our results, solidarity is merely a rhetorical excuse to prevent competition 
among Spanish airports. In reality, competition would constrain discretionary power of policy 
makers and bureaucrats over management and budgets. We are aware that the public choice 
paradigm for explaining policymaking is too simple and naïve, and policy processes are much more 
complex than can be explained by the self-interested policy maker alone. The problem here is that, 
when analyzing why the system of airport management and finance in Spain is different from any 
other comparable country, we do not find much more than rhetoric about solidarity to prevent 
competition in order to maximize power and budget.   17
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Table 1. Major airports and air traffic of passengers in EU-25 countries.* 2002 
              Note: Data for Greece is not available.  







Country Number  of 
















National airport networks 
with total passengers > 
100,000 (10
3) 
         
United Kingdom  8 168,742  22,617  146,125  Decentralized private,  regional  gov. 
Germany  8 114,383  20,402  93,981  Decentralized private,  regional  gov. 
and national gov. 
Spain  9 112,254  29,022  83,232  Centralized  national government  
           
National airport networks 
with total passengers > 
50,000 (10
3) 
         
France  6 96,526  27,921  68,605  Decentralized  national gov. (Paris), 
chambers of commerce 
(rest)  
Italy  6 65,228  22,527  42,701  Decentralized  private, regional gov.  
           
National airport networks 
with total passengers > 
12,500 (10
3) 
         
Sweden  2 22,039  7,445  14,595  Centralized  national government 
Portugal  2 17,382  2,930  14,451  Centralized  national government 
Netherlands  1 40,828  204  40,625  Decentralized  private, national gov. 
Denmark  1 19,930  1,684  18,246  Decentralized  private, national gov. 
Ireland  1 18,235  659  17,576  Centralized  national government 
Austria  1 14,944  530  14,414  Decentralized  private, national gov. 
Belgium  1 14,316  1  14,315  Decentralized  private, regional gov. 
          
National airport networks 
with total passengers < 
12,500 (10
3) 
        
Finland  1 10,296  2,766  7,530  Centralized  national government 
Czech Republic  1 6,579  148  6,432  Centralized  national government 
Cyprus  1 6,205  Na na  Centralized  national government 
Hungary  1 4,469  Na na  Centralized  national government 
Poland  - 6,542  Na na  Centralized  national government 
Malta  - 2,640  47  2,593  Centralized  national government 
Luxembourg  - 1,505  -  1,505  Centralized  national government 
Slovenia  - 866  Na  na  Decentralized  private, national gov. 
Lithuania  - 701  Na  na  Centralized  national government 
Latvia  - 633  Na  na  Centralized  national government 
Estonia  - 603  13  590  Centralized  national government 
Slovakia  - 497  32  465  Centralized  national government   19
Table 2. Spanish airport data. Annual mean values in period 1994-2003 




















Share of total 
population  
(Spain = 40,625,484.3) 
(7) 
GDP per capita 
Index at 2003 
(Spain=100) 
Madrid Madrid-Barajas,   
Madrid-Cuatro Vientos 
489.97 58.63% 27,399,716  22.04% 2.66 12.91%  133.58 
Catalonia  Barcelona, Girona, Reus, Sabadell 119.74  14.33%  18,156,802  14.54% 0.99  15.46%  118.37 
Canarias  G. Canaria, Tenerife N., Tenerife S., 




27,643,609 22.70%  0.38  4.18%  88.03 
Balears  Palma Majorca, Ibiza, Menorca  58.29 6.98%  23,639,799  19.37% 0.36  2.04%  107.10 
Andalusia Malaga,  Almeria, Seville, Cordoba, 
Granada, Jerez 
28.66 3.43%  11,984,349  9.65% 0.36  18.07%  76.62 
Basque C.  Bilbao, San Sebastian, Vitoria  20,85  2.49%  2,515,530  2.03%  1.23 5.19%  125.66 
Valencian C.  Alicante, Valencia  18.48 2.21% 7,421,601  5.97% 0.37  10.16%  94.93 
Galicia  Santiago, Coruna, Vigo  10.71  1.28% 2,347,746  1.92% 0.67  6.78%  80.17 
Asturias Oviedo 5.23  0.63%  671,146  0.53%  1.18 2.68%  86.26 
Castile&Leon Valladolid,  Salamanca, Leon  2.93  0.35%  242,742  0.20%  1.75 6.17%  95.02 
Aragon Saragossa 2.76  0.33%  238,766  0.21%  1.57 2.95%  109.59 
Cantabria Santander  1.54  0.18% 229,282  0.20%  0.92  1.32%  96.00 
Navarra Pamplona 1.20  0.14%  279,527 0.21%  0.69  1.34%  130.17 
Murcia Murcia 0.49  0.06%  192,530 0.15%  0.39  2.83%  85.96 
Extremadura Badajoz  0.13  0.01% 30,260  0.02%  0.63  2.65%  66.45 
Note: Madrid-Cuatro Vientos and Sabadell are very small airports close to Madrid-Barajas and Barcelona, respectively. They do not support any significant commercial traffic. 
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    Table 3. Investment equation estimates. N = 150 
 Note 1: Standard errors in parenthesis  
     Note 2: Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
 Note 3: Wald1: Wald Test (χ2) of joint significance 
                  BP_ Breusch-Pagan LM test of cross-sectional correlation 
                  Wald2: Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
                  Dp: Bhargava et al. test for serial autocorrelation (modified Durbin-Watson test) 
                   
 
                                                                              
Table 4. Estimated elasticities (evaluated at sample means) 
Dependent variable: INV 




PW (IV) without 
time  specific 
effects 









































Dependent variable: INV  
  FGLS  PW  PW (IV) without time 
specific effects 
PW (IV) with time 
specific effects 
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Table 5. Investment equation estimates. N = 150 
Note 1: Standard errors in parenthesis  
 Note 2: Significance at 1% (**), 5% (*) 
 Note 3: Wald1: Wald Test of joint significance 
              BP_ Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence  
              Wald2: Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
              Dp: Bhargava et al. test for serial autocorrelation (modified Durbin-Watson test) 
 
 
Table 6. Estimated elasticities (evaluated at sample means) 
Dependent variable: INV 
 
 
FGLS   PW  PW (IV) without time 
specific effects 














































Dependent variable: INV 
  FGLS   PW  PW (IV) without time 
specific effects 
PW (IV) with time 
specific effects 
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Table 7. Investment equation estimates. N = 150 
Note 1: Standard errors in parenthesis  
Note 2: Significance at 1% (**), 5% (*) 
Note 3: Wald1: Wald Test of joint significance 
              BP_ Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence  
              Wald2: Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
              Dp: Bhargava et al. test for serial autocorrelation (modified Durbin-Watson test) 
 
 
Table 8. Estimated elasticities (evaluated at sample means) 
Dependent variable: INV 
 
 
FGLS   PW  PW (IV) without time 
specific effects 
PW (IV) with time 
specific effects 
 












































Dependent variable: INV  
  FGLS  PW  PW (IV) without time 
specific effects 
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Appendix 1 
 
Table A-1. Descriptive statistics (Number of observations: 150) 






Total Investment (103 euros) 
Percentage of total investment 
Gross Domestic Product per capita 
Total output (Annual passengers carried) 
Percentage of total output 






































Table A-2. Spanish airports operating profits. Millions of euros 




Share of the total 
surplus generated 
by regions with 
surplus  







Madrid   Madrid-Barajas, Madrid-Cuatro 
Vientos 
89.7 39.3%  45.7%  2.66 
 
Canary Islands 
Gran Canaria, Tenerife Norte, 
Tenerife sur, Fuerteventura, 










Catalonia Barcelona, Girona, Reus, 
Sabadell 
40.2 17.6%  20.5%  0.99 
Balearic Islands  Palma Majorca, Ibiza, Menorca  41.8  18.3%  21.3%  0.36 
Com. Valenciana  Alicante, Valencia 10.8  4.7%  5.5%  0.37 
Andalusia  Malaga, Almeria, Seville, 
Cordoba, Granada, Jerez 
5.1 2.2%  2.6%  0.36 
Surplus in system      228.3  100.0%    
         
Extremadura Badajoz  -0.6   -0.3%  0.63 
Castile & Leon  Valladolid, Salamanca, Leon  -1.8   -0.9%  1.75 
Murcia Murcia -2.0   -1.0%  0.39 
Navarra Pamplona -2.1   -1,1%  0.69 
Asturias Oviedo -2.6   -1.3%  1.18 
Cantabria Santander  -2.8   -1.4%  0.92 
Aragon Saragossa -2.9   -1.5%  1.57 
Galicia  Santiago, Coruna, Vigo  -6.9   -3.5%  0.67 
Basque Country  Bilbao, San Sebastian, Vitoria  -7.6   -3.9%  1.23 
Losses in system    -32.2      
          
Network surplus    196.1   100.0%   
Note: 1998 is the last year for which financial data on operating results for individual airports has been made available by AENA. See footnote 11 above. 
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Appendix 2 
 
    Table A-3. Investment equation estimates (investment per capita). N = 150 
Note 1: Standard errors in parenthesis  
          Note 2: Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
          Note 3: Wald1: Wald Test (χ2) of joint significance 
                       BP_ Breusch-Pagan LM test of cross-sectional correlation (χ2) 
                       Wald2: Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
                       Dp: Bhargava et al. test for serial autocorrelation (modified Durbin-Watson test) 
                                                    
                                                    
Table A-4. Estimated elasticities (evaluated at sample means) 
Dependent variable: INVc 






PW (IV) with time 
specific effects 
(1) 
PW (IV) with time 
specific effects 
(2) 

















































































PW (IV) with time 
specific effects 
(1) 
PW (IV) with time 
specific effects 
(2) 
PW (IV) with time 
specific effects 
(3) 
 
GDP  
 
PAX 
 
INTERN 
 
INVC(-1) 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
Incumbent 
 
Correspond. 
 
Intercept 
 
0.0017 (0.0006)*** 
 
2.56e-06 (3.04e-06)*** 
 
-19.32 (10.82)* 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-21.43 (9.32)** 
 
0.0017 (0.0003)*** 
 
2.56e-06 (4.20e-07)*** 
 
-19.32 (9.61)** 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-21.43 (4.91)** 
 
0.0014 (0.0004)*** 
 
2.15e-06 (5.84e-07)*** 
 
-18.98 (9.45)** 
 
0.23 (0.17) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-21.75 (10.21)** 
 
0.0017 (0.0006)*** 
 
2.21e-06 (5.83e-07)*** 
 
-19.60 (9.14)** 
 
0.21 (0.18) 
 
3.03 (9.02) 
 
7.00 (9.88) 
 
-1.76 (9.62) 
 
-8.24 (7.40) 
 
-10.79 (7.90) 
 
-10.83 (8.56) 
 
-3.84 (8.78) 
 
1.76 (8.74) 
 
-0.67 (8.81) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
-19.94 (8.40)** 
 
0.0029 (0.0009)*** 
 
2.52e-06 (6.73e-07)*** 
 
-21.94 (9.89)** 
 
0.11 (0.18) 
 
2.95 (8.70) 
 
2.31 (10.28) 
 
-6.74 (10.03) 
 
-14.69 (8.47)* 
 
-18.38 (9.34)* 
 
-25.71 (12.09)** 
 
-19.47 (12.57) 
 
-14.28 (12.66) 
 
-17.05 (12.90) 
 
83.06 (28.95)*** 
 
- 
 
-61.23 (19.91)** 
 
 
0.0014 (0.0005)*** 
 
2.60e-06 (6.83e-07)*** 
 
-25.23 (11.12)** 
 
0.17 (0.17) 
 
2.89 (8.52) 
 
2.59 (9.78) 
 
-5.91 (9.53) 
 
-12.62 (7.76) 
 
-15.12 (8.31)* 
 
-12.42 (8.51) 
 
-5.08 (8.67) 
 
1.04 (8.55) 
 
-1..03 (8.57) 
 
- 
 
13.75 (5.30)*** 
 
-20.70 (8.49)** 
 
Wald1  
R2 
BP 
Wald2 
Dp 
166.83*** 
- 
461.435*** 
39,066.68*** 
0.65 
96.02*** 
0.53 
- 
- 
0.65 
112.53*** 
0.54 
- 
- 
0.73 
14,505.59*** 
0.57 
- 
- 
0.74 
13,684.08*** 
0.60 
- 
- 
0.77 
12,003.08*** 
0.59 
- 
- 
0.74 